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National Self-Determination in 
Historical Perspective: 
The Legacy of the 
French Revolution for 
Today's Debates 
Chim ne I. Keitner 
Asignificant number of today's most violent conflicts seem to be fu- 
eled, if not created, by the desire of nations to control their own states. 
Recent headlines include renewed bombing by Basque separatists, 
the outbreak of hostilities along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, demonstra- 
tions and clashes over secession in the Comoros, heightened tension between 
China and Taiwan over the island's political status, investigations into past 
violence in East Timor and reports of current violence in Aceh, and accusa- 
tions of torture by Russian soldiers in Chechnya. It may not be a world war, 
but much of the world is at war. What is going on here? And how can we 
better understand it? 
The nation-state principle posits an international society composed of sov- 
ereign nation-states. Although the assumption that nations and states should 
be congruent may appear outdated or benign, it may create volatile expecta- 
tions and lead to secessionist and irredentist claims. These are likely to arise 
when socioeconomic and political discontent becomes focused on discrepan- 
cies between the boundaries of historically and culturally distinct communi- 
ties and the borders of states whose control over these groups is perceived as 
illegitimate. 
This article analyzes the normative framework within which nation-based 
demands for political and territorial control are articulated and addressed. The 
goal is to introduce greater conceptual clarity into debates about the nature 
and validity of these claims. The French Revolution is often upheld as the 
birthplace of the modern nation-state and of modern nationalism more 
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generally.' Although oversimplified, this accepted wisdom offers a fruitful start- 
ing point for exploring the origins and implications of enduring understand- 
ings about the relationship between nations and states as the building blocks 
of international society. 
The idea of "one nation, one state" (the nation-state principle) and the 
corresponding conviction that self-identified nations ought to have control of 
their own states (national self-determination) yield a cluster of political and 
ethical arguments with both internal and external resonance. Internally, these 
ideas are used to mobilize particular populations by legitimating and channel- 
ing frustration in the face of exclusion from the dominant political order, unjust 
treatment by those in power (especially vis-a-vis other identifiable groups), and 
lack of redress within existing governmental structures. Externally, these argu- 
ments and the assumptions they entail bolster nation-based claims in the global 
arena, centered largely on the idea of a people's right to self-determination 
contained in U.N. instruments and drafted in the context of decolonization. 
From the French revolutionaries to Giuseppe Mazzini to Abdullah Ocalan, 
political leaders have found the idea of the nation particularly resonant and 
powerful. The ambiguity of the nation makes it problematic as a conceptual 
category but enhances its attractiveness as a platform for political mobilization. 
According to David Miller, a nation can be defined as "a community of people 
with an aspiration to be politically self-determining," and a state as "the set of 
political institutions that they may aspire to possess for themselves." 2 State- 
hood is valued because it enshrines internal control over a given territory and 
population and external sovereignty in international relations, including free- 
dom from intervention by other states (except perhaps in cases of egregious 
human rights abuse). Nations achieve internal control and external indepen- 
dence through recognition as sovereign states and thus as members of inter- 
national society. 
Sovereign statehood is not the only-and perhaps not even the most 
common-political embodiment of nations in the contemporary international 
system, but it remains a basic aspiration and entitlement of nations in a purely 
nation-statist model. Despite the growing importance of regional organiza- 
tions, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
'See, for example, Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in 
the Modern World (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1996), p. 2; G.P. Gooch, Studies in 
Modern History (London: Longmans, 1931), p. 217; Eugene Kamenka, "Political 
Nationalism-The Evolution of the Idea," in E. Kamenka, ed., Nationalism: The Nature 
and Evolution of an Idea (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), p. 10; Hans Kohn, Prelude 
to Nation-States: The French and German Experience 1789-1815 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 82; and Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 
1991), p. 18. 
2David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1995), p. 19. 
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nonstate actors in international relations, it is probably still safe to say that we 
live-or at least think we live-in a world of nation-states. The "right of 
self-determination" of peoples enshrined in Article I of the United Nations 
Charter and in Common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants is generally limited 
to the context of decolonization when understood as a right to sovereign state- 
hood.3 Yet this restriction is difficult to justify within a nation-statist model. 
There is no self-evident reason why the metaoption of separate statehood ought 
to be granted to former colonies but denied to other self-identified national 
groups. 
Of course, "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" 
is difficult to operationalize without a clear definition of "peoples." 4 Virtually 
all formulations of self-determination seem to take for granted the existence of 
distinct and identifiable collectives, and for good reason: after all, if a nation is 
defined only by its political institutions, then the nation-state principle is a 
truism, and the story ends there.5 Ian Brownlie's definition of self-determination 
as "the right of cohesive national groups ('peoples') to choose for themselves a 
form of political organization and their relation to other groups"; John Stuart 
Mill's observation that "one hardly knows what any division of the human race 
should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective 
bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves"; and Ernest Gell- 
ner's affirmation that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent"-all postulate the 
existence of prepolitical nations that provide an independent standard for the 
legitimacy of states.6 
In the nation-statist model, state legitimacy depends on whether the state 
embodies a particular nation, or at least whether the nations within the state 
have consented to its control. Whether or not nations are actually freestanding 
entities that exist in the world, the idea of national self-determination as a 
logical corollary of the nation-state principle offers a potent platform for chal- 
3See Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current 
Development on the Basis of UN Documents, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1; and H6ctor 
Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of UN Resolutions, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1. 
4 Woodrow Wilson's alleged comment hat he "knows a people when he sees one" 
provides little reassurance on this point. 
5Not surprisingly, this tautology is strongly endorsed by existing states seeking to 
preclude secessionist claims. 
6Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 599; John Stuart Mill, "Representative Government" (1861), 
Three Essays: On Liberty, Representative Government, and The Subjection of Women 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 381; and Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1. 
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lenging the political and territorial status quo.7 Practical obstacles and conflicts 
may arise, but these do not impair the soundness of the principle itself: to each 
nation, its own state. 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NOTION 
OF VOLUNTARIST NATIONALISM 
Where does the French Revolution fit into all of this? Proponents of the nation- 
state principle tend to take it as a given-a set of core assumptions based on 
shared understandings, if not common sense. But there is nothing natural or 
inevitable about nation-states, and few states in the world conform to this ideal 
model. Far from making the presumed congruence between nations and states 
obsolete, this disjunction gives rise to conflicting and potentially irreconcilable 
perspectives and expectations. The tension between the pervasiveness of non- 
national states and the persistence of normative standards based largely, if implic- 
itly, on the nation-state principle fuels inconsistency and even incoherence in 
international law and practice. 
The idea of an international system composed of sovereign states, generally 
dubbed the Westphalian model, provides a structural framework for relations 
between distinct political and territorial units. Standing alone, this model offers 
few criteria besides effective control for delineating states and investing them 
with the rights and duties of membership in international society. Elements of 
this model characterize current international relations: effective control remains 
an important (though no longer exclusive) test for state recognition, and states 
are still considered the central members of international society, with this status 
enshrined by membership in the United Nations. 
Although the United Nations could not be called the "United States" for 
obvious reasons, there is something deeper at work in the frequent conflation of 
the terms "nation" and "state" in popular, political, and even scholarly dis- 
course. This "something deeper" stems largely from the tacit assumption that 
all states are or should be nation-states. If the Treaty of Westphalia provides a 
convenient, though not entirely historically accurate, shorthand for the birth of 
the modern state system, then the French Revolution performs a similar func- 
tion for the idea of the modern nation-state. 
In the ideal version of this model, prepolitical nations should determine the 
legitimacy of states for both consequentialist and deontological reasons. On a 
practical level, national ties are presumed to ensure the cohesiveness and admin- 
istrability of a linguistically and culturally unified population and to motivate 
7 For a brief analytical overview of this phenomenon, see Chimene I. Keitner, "Power 
and Identity in Nationalist Conflicts," Oxford International Review 8, No. 2 (1997), 
pp. 2-10. 
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the compliance and commitment of a polity's members to its institutions and 
commands, based on the presumed identification between the government and 
the governed. This presumed identification is also valued in itself as a moral 
good because of the conviction that people should be-and would choose to 
be-governed by members of their own community. In this picture, national 
self-determination supports the values of both collective identity and individ- 
ual choice. 
The two senses of self-government-participation of the population in polit- 
ical decisions through voting and identity between the government and the 
governed-are often conflated. There are at least two reasons why the idea of 
national self-determination (the presumption that a nation should have control 
of its own state) is often closely connected to ideals of liberation and demo- 
cratic self-governance. First, it seems intuitively plausible (if not borne out by 
experience) that a people is best able to choose and to implement its own con- 
ception of the good life when governed by its own members. Second, the con- 
crete historical connection between the rise of the nation as a political platform 
and the overthrow of monarchy during the French Revolution helped fuse the 
ideas of national self-determination and popular sovereignty in political rheto- 
ric and in the popular imagination. 
Despite the auspicious beginnings of the French Revolution in proclaiming 
the nation the fundamental source of political sovereignty and legitimacy, Napo- 
leonic conquest in the early nineteenth century and German aggression in the 
twentieth revealed the darker side of nationalist policies. They demonstrated 
the potential for internal oppression and the appetite for external domination. 
More recently, campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" and the rise of the rhetoric of 
"blood and belonging" in the Balkans and other regions have further discred- 
ited the idea that national bonds based on the reality or the fiction of common 
descent should be regarded as legitimate foundations of modern political com- 
munities. The feeling persists that there is something important, in principle 
and practice, behind the conviction that shared identity and understanding is 
valuable, and perhaps even necessary for a democratic polity to remain cohe- 
sive and responsive to its members' needs. This intuition is particularly strong 
in the face of disunity and discontent in what are perceived as increasingly 
pluralistic and fragmented state populations. 
The impulse to preserve some element of the nation-state idea has led to a 
common distinction between ethnic and civic varieties of nationalism; the latter 
continues generally to be advocated and endorsed. The French Revolution seems 
to exemplify civic nationalism, as the French population at the time of the 
Revolution was clearly too diverse to constitute an ethnic nation, and revolu- 
tionary rhetoric tended to focus on political rights rather than ethnic belonging. 
Yet the uncritical identification of the French Revolution with a purely civic 
model misses crucial aspects of the revolutionary view of the nation as the basis 
for political legitimacy and the ultimate source and holder of sovereignty. As 
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noted, the nation-state principle makes sense as a standard for territorial delin- 
eation and political control only if one can point to a prepolitical nation inde- 
pendent of its institutional manifestations. It would be circular to appeal to 
institutions to justify institutions, so nationalist leaders must appeal to some- 
thing else. 
The discrediting of strategies that invoke a preexisting ethnic "something 
else," based on the idea of individuals belonging involuntarily and essentially 
to an ethnic nation, has led to support for voluntarist models of national mem- 
bership as the products of individual choice. But this choice cannot simply be 
manifested in allegiance to the political institutions of the state. One must be 
able to differentiate between the nation and the state, both conceptually and 
concretely, if the former is to serve as a basis for legitimating or challenging the 
latter. The following analysis of revolutionary principles and practice reveals 
that appeals to civic nationhood are not immune from the problems associated 
with invoking other prepolitical forms of belonging. At the same time, the 
importance of cohesion, understanding, and commitment within a political body 
suggests why nationalist arguments are persuasive to begin with and why they 
cannot be completely discredited or ignored. 
THE FOUR PARADOXES 
The French Revolution, as might be expected, may be characterized by multi- 
ple and even competing historical narratives. The conjunction of numerous 
factors provided the occasion for a series of uprisings and political challenges 
that began in 1789 and endured for the better part of a decade: the perceived 
inefficiency and financial instability of the monarchy under Louis XVI; a per- 
vasive resentment toward the privileges of the nobility and the clergy harbored 
by the increasingly powerful merchant and professional classes (the Third Estate); 
insecurity and agitation among peasants resulting in part from a particularly 
bad harvest after the winter of 1788; and an intellectual climate charged by a 
spirit of inquiry and challenge to existing models, not least in matters of gov- 
ernment. Although this analysis focuses on the conceptual and institutional 
transformations of the revolutionary decade, it is important not to lose sight of 
the socioeconomic preconditions to these fundamental shifts. 
Political terms, especially new and abstract ones, are not used in precisely the 
same way by each contemporary speaker, nor do they travel through time and space 
unchanged. But the unmistakable rise to prominence of the "nation" in revolu- 
tionary rhetoric, including justifications for both domestic and international 
actions, and the subsequent attribution of the idea of nation-statehood to the rev- 
olutionary experience, argue strongly in favor of examining revolutionary debates 
as a key to a deeper understanding of the uses and abuses of nationhood. 
A study of the emergence of the nation as a political platform during the 
French Revolution produces a framework of four paradoxes: conception, con- 
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stitution, composition, and confrontation. The tensions captured by these head- 
ings remain relevant and problematic in the present. The paradox of conception 
relates to the difficulty of thinking of the nation as an entity separate from its 
political institutions. The nation-state principle in theory (if not in practice) 
treats nations as preexisting groups of people united by a certain kind of bond 
that makes them particularly suited to and deserving of exclusive control over 
their own government and territory. Yet it is unclear how this notion of prepo- 
litical nationhood applies to the case of a voluntarist nation ostensibly defined 
by individual choice and commitment rather than biological characteristics, 
reflecting the kind of nation the French Revolution is generally seen as having 
championed and the model of nationhood upheld by many as the most appeal- 
ing and deserving of support today. 
The paradox of constitution highlights a second problem-that is, identify- 
ing who can speak legitimately on the nation's behalf. The risk that political 
powerseekers will take advantage of the availability of nationalist platforms to 
further their own aims may be difficult to avoid. This suggests a need for cau- 
tion in attributing prima facie legitimacy to those who claim to speak for the 
nation. At the same time, it is unclear that other actors could effectively drive 
political and institutional change and whether they could do so in the name of 
something other than the nation. 
The paradox of composition focuses on a later stage of the nation-state's 
development, when the time comes to delineate insiders and outsiders to estab- 
lish government policies and distribute social benefits. Even-and perhaps 
especially-in a voluntarist nation, the dual impulses to refine the definition of 
national membership (to aid excluding political opponents) and to make it 
"thicker" and more concrete (to solidify bonds of allegiance and belonging) 
may engender illiberal and arbitrarily restrictive results. 
Finally, the paradox of confrontation focuses on the principles guiding inter- 
action among sovereign political units in the international arena. During the 
French revolutionary period, the desire to reestablish France as a great power 
within the existing international system operated alongside many revolutionar- 
ies' self-assigned mission of transforming that system into one composed exclu- 
sively of self-determining nation-states (self-determining on a strictly French 
model). The result of their efforts was a series of violent and protracted wars. 
Taken together, these paradoxes illustrate the quandaries of the revolutionary 
experiment and suggest the complexities underlying the idea of national self- 
determination as a basis for international political order. 
Conception: How to Imagine a Voluntarist Nation? 
The paradox of conception highlights the difficulty of conceiving of a prepo- 
litical entity without reference to its institutional manifestations, especially if 
that entity is envisaged as "voluntarist" rather than defined by preexisting and 
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readily apparent characteristics and ties. Although such complications could 
have rendered nationalist arguments more precarious and less useful during the 
French revolutionary period, they in fact contributed to the expediency and 
popularity of the nation as a particularly malleable and potent platform for 
making political and territorial claims. 
During the eighteenth century, successive waves of political actors seeking 
greater influence within and beyond the monarchy found that they first had to 
challenge the self-referential and self-justifying quality of monarchical rule. 
They did this by developing and relying on the idea of the nation as distinct 
from and prior to the king. This idea evoked both an embryonic notion of the 
French population as a rights-bearing (if passive) constituency and a more abstract 
vision of the nation as a historically transcendent source of authority separate 
from the monarch, who could no longer claim exclusively to embody or repre- 
sent it. 
Shifts in fundamental understandings about the nature and justification of 
political institutions (driven largely by power struggles among various political 
actors) were accompanied and catalyzed by transformations in the words used 
to express basic political concepts, and even in the concepts themselves. The 
changes in everyday language were palpable, beginning in the 1750s and car- 
rying through to the revolutionary decade. One contemporary observed the 
following: 
Never have the words nation and state been as frequently used as they are 
today: these two terms were never uttered under Louis XIV; even the idea of 
them was lacking. We have never been so aware as we are today of the rights 
of the nation and of liberty.8 
At the height of the absolute monarchy, the king was, in effect, the embodi- 
ment of three other entities: the state (the territory plus the administrative struc- 
ture), the nation (the population thought of in an abstract but territorially defined 
fashion), and the people (his actual subjects). A distinction among these cat- 
egories was precluded by definition. 
By 1766, Louis XV could no longer simply assert his authority as had his 
ostensibly omnipotent predecessor. Instead, he felt compelled to defend it: 
As if anyone could forget that the sovereign power resides in my person only. .. 
that public order in its entirety emanates from me and that the rights and 
interests of the nation, which some dare to regard as a separate body from the 
8Marquis d'Argenson, entry from June 26, 1754, in Jacques B. Rathdry, ed., Jour- 
nal et memoires du marquis d'Argenson, vol. 8 (Paris, 1866), p. 315; translated in 
Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 22. 
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monarch, are necessarily united with my rights and interests, and repose only 
in my hands.9 
By affirming that the nation's interests were united with his own and depended 
on him, Louis XV in fact contributed to the very distinction that he was trying 
to negate. Louis XVI did the same in calling for the Nation to rescue the State 
during the fiscal crisis of 1788-89. The nation could perhaps bolster the state, 
but it could also check it. This was the first step on the path to the nation 
becoming the state's very basis. 
This process of consolidating the self-image of the French people as a nation 
was reflected in and enhanced by the use of the adjective "national." One satir- 
ical tract written in the form of a dictionary (a common polemical strategy) 
explains this word, wryly emphasizing its pervasiveness: 
["national" is an] adjective that qualifies all that belongs to the nation; more- 
over, everything belongs to the nation, so everything is national.... Since the 
revolution our physical and moral way of being has become entirely national; 
our dress, from the cockade down to the buckles, is national. Our way of 
thinking, Lord knows how national it is! and our written works are like our 
thoughts. 
o 
This citation shows how all-encompassing the revolutionary idea of the nation 
could become." It provides testimony, however mocking, to the transforma- 
tion of language and mentalities and to their manifestation in everyday life. 
By the time of the Revolution, the nation was poised to become the central 
platform for claims to political legitimacy and territorial control. This was 
reflected in the definition of crimes of treason and the words for describing it, 
which ultimately went from lhse-majeste' (treason to the king) to lhse-nation, 
lhse-patrie, lhse-libertd, and even lese-humanit" (treason to the nation, to the 
country, to liberty, and to humanity).12 Changes in the word for treason reflected 
the prescribed transfer of loyalty from the king to the nation and to the values of 
the French revolutionary nation-state. The meanings of these new political 
9 Jules Flammermont ed., Remontrances du parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siecle, 
vol. 2 (Paris, 1888-98), p. 557: translated in John Rothney, The Brittany Affair and the 
Crisis of the Ancien Regime (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 177. 
'0Pierre-Nicolas Chantreau, Dictionnaire national et anecdotique pour servir a 
l'intelligence des mots dont notre langue s'est enrichie depuis la revolution, et a la 
nouvelle signification qu'ont revue quelques anciens mots (Paris: Politicopolis, 1790), 
pp. 132-33, author's trans. 
1 The permanent exhibit on the Revolution at the Musee Carnavalet, Paris, displays 
everything from dinnerware painted with revolutionary mottoes to trunks with metal 
locks sculpted in the shape of the Bastille. 
12 Beatrice Fry Hyslop, French Nationalism in 1789, According to the General Cahiers 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p. 159. 
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terms did not go uncontested. But far from compromising the importance of 
new concepts, such debates in fact confirmed the theoretical and practical cen- 
trality of the nation in the emerging political order. 
The revolutionary account of the relationship between king and nation, and 
its expression in political vocabulary, ultimately defined the criteria for politi- 
cal authority in France. The conceptual relationship between nation and state in 
a nation-statist framework is most clearly explained in Leon Duguit's (much 
later) Treatise on Constitutional Law: 
The nation is the original holder and source of sovereignty. The nation is a 
person, with all the attributes of personality, conscience, and will. The person 
nation is, in reality, distinct from the State; it is anterior to it (the State); the 
State cannot exist except where there is a nation; and the nation can subsist 
even when the State no longer exists or does not yet exist.13 
This vision lies at the heart of a nation-based account of the political and ter- 
ritorial legitimacy of states, on both the domestic (internal) and the inter- 
national (external) levels. 
The idea of a voluntarist nation seems compelling-not least for Western 
liberals seeking to establish consistent global standards for state legitimacy-as 
it appears to offer grounds for social cohesion, territorial delineation, and polit- 
ical mobilization that are maximally inclusive and minimally predetermined. 
But its viability as an international political standard is by no means self- 
evident. The voluntarist nation seems at odds with the nation-statist assump- 
tion that there are preexisting nations, which, because of their prepolitical 
solidarity, cohesion, and distinctiveness, are entitled to their own territorial 
states. The question of what criteria one could point to as evidence of the exis- 
tence of a prepolitical, voluntarist nation remains unanswered, jeopardizing the 
coherence of this category as a basis for adjudicating political and territorial 
claims. 
Constitution: How to Give the Nation a Political Voice? 
As the preceding argument suggests, concrete power struggles within the French 
monarchy served as a driving force behind the ever-increasing emphasis on 
the idea of the nation. In coopting and implementing the contractualist require- 
ment of popular consent (loosely adopted from political theorists including 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau) to bolster their own importance, the parlements (French 
sovereign law courts) discovered and enshrined the effectiveness of claims for 
political power made in the name of the nation, which was a rhetorical entity 
abstract enough to be manipulated yet concrete enough to be compelling. Not 
'3 Lon Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel 2d ed., vol. 1 (Paris: E. de Boccard, 
1921), p. 607. 
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surprisingly, the deliberate use of the nation by the parlements as a vehicle 
for their own political ambitions had the unintended effect of opening the 
door for other self-styled national spokespeople to override the parlements' 
claims. 
The paradox of constitution focuses on the need to rely on those who speak 
on behalf of the nation to validate and implement the nation's political demands.'4 
In theory, the revolutionary nation became a political actor; in practice, politics 
became a competition between individuals and parties claiming to speak on the 
nation's behalf. Political discourse became a kind of reverse ventriloquism, 
whereby rhetoricians asserted that they were speaking in the nation's name and 
even with the nation's voice; conflicting claims led successive leaders to be 
denounced as "inauthentic" and replaced with often equally precarious pretend- 
ers.'5 In this fashion, the nation developed into a central legitimating platform 
without necessarily promoting the interests of the individuals within it or con- 
tributing to political stability. 
The political claims of the parlements were articulated and popularized through 
official "remonstrances," petitions submitted to the king and often published and 
circulated illicitly among the population at large. The remonstrances had three im- 
portant effects from the perspective of this analysis. First, they emphasized the 
distinction between king and state, extrapolating from the abstract idea of so- 
called "fundamental aws" as restraints on the arbitrary exercise of monarchical 
power to suggest the conditional nature of the king's legitimacy, separate from the 
stable existence of the French state per se. Second, they reinforced the idea of a 
people with its own rights and interests, which had to be protected (by the par- 
lements) against unjustified encroachment. Third, they enshrined the concept of 
the nation as a particularly strong and compelling way to represent the French pop- 
ulation as spatially unified and temporally continuous, creating a practice of mak- 
ing political claims in the nation's name. These three developments were essential 
stages in the emergence of the nation as the basis of the state's legitimacy and a 
central platform for claims to political power. 
The parlements championed the nation's importance incrementally. Accord- 
ing to parliamentary rhetoric, only those who upheld the rights of the nation 
could stake a legitimate claim to political power. The more the parlements felt 
their own existence was threatened, the more they emphasized the importance 
of the nation and their unique role in protecting it. A typical remonstrance 
insists on the importance of consulting the nation, represented by the parlements: 
'4This leads to a certain circularity since, as Paul Gilbert suggests, "the ability to 
support [and, one might add, to articulate] a claim to statehood is partly constitutive of 
our notion of a nation" ("Criteria of Nationality and the Ethics of Self-Determination," 
History of European Ideas 16, Nos. 4-6 [1993], pp. 515-520; quote on p. 516). 
5 This trope of authenticity surfaces in both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. 
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This right could not be lost for the Nation; it is imprescriptible, inalienable. To 
attack this principle is to betray not only the Nation, but kings themselves; it is 
to overturn the constitution of the Kingdom, it is to destroy the foundation of 
the authority of the Monarch.16 
The parlements presented themselves as indispensable to the king's 
political survival while they staked out their own political territory. Although 
clever, this approach proved difficult to sustain, as the parlements' emphasis 
on the rights of the nation eventually overrode their claims to bolster the 
king. From mere guardians of the social contract, the parlements soon por- 
trayed themselves as the defenders, and ultimately the voice, of the nation 
itself. 
The nation thus proved a crucial platform for the parlements' claims-as long 
as they could ensure a monopoly on its use. Predictably, this strategy proved dan- 
gerous by paving the way for the appropriation of the parlements' arguments by 
other political contenders. The parlements' emphasis on the primacy of the na- 
tion and the importance of national consent became disengaged from parliamen- 
tary rhetoric and entered popular political discourse, laying the foundations for a 
radical reconceptualization of the nature and origins of legitimate political au- 
thority, with ultimate consequences beyond parliamentary control. 
Facing a debt crisis at the end of 1788, the king convoked the Estates Gen- 
eral, an official meeting of representatives of the three estates (the clergy, the 
nobility, and the Third Estate), last called in 1614. This move opened the door 
for a new, more "authentic" set of national spokespeople to replace the parle- 
ments as the voice of the French nation. Specifically, the Third Estate declared 
itself the National Assembly in response to its perceived exclusion from mean- 
ingful political debates in an act often upheld as marking the beginning of the 
revolutionary uprising. The title "National Assembly" captures the delegates' 
conviction in the supremacy of the nation and their desire to be viewed as its 
authoritative voice.17 
The danger that the recognition of authoritative national spokespeople might 
undermine the voluntarist premises behind support for popular participation in 
government was not lost on the critics of political reform. Andre-Quentin Bude 
tersely bemoaned: "The good of the people is the supreme law: a perfectly 
vague maxim, and, by that alone, a perfectly tyrannical one." ,8 Jean-Pierre 
'16Remonstrances of the Parlement of Bordeaux, February 25, 1771; in Roger Bick- 
art, Les Parlements et la notion de souverainetd nationale (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932), 
p. 79, author's trans. 
17Gazette nationale ou le moniteur universel, Assemblee Constituante 1, No. 9, 
session of June 17, 1789, p. 83. 
'8 Andre-Quentin Bude, Nouveau dictionnaire pour servir a l'intelligence des ter- 
mes mis en vogue par la Revolution (Paris, 1792), pp. 96-97, author's trans. 
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Gallais concurred: "In every town, in every village, we find the nation exercis- 
ing all the rights of sovereignty, which at times obtains for us rather ferocious 
sovereigns." 19 These concerns, present from the beginning, were voiced with 
increasing urgency as the Revolution progressed. The struggle for political power 
exacerbated the theoretical tensions captured in the paradox of conception, with 
ultimately authoritarian results. 
The creation of the National Assembly began as part of an attempt to reinforce 
monarchical legitimacy by reaffirming the nation's support for the king in the 
face of perceived usurpation of political power by the privileged classes. Yet 
the king's reluctance to accept a constitutional mandate, which would have 
circumscribed his absolute power, added grist to the mill of more radical reform. 
The National Assembly, created to represent the nation before the king, ended 
up institutionalizing the primacy of the nation itself. 
The nation may be conceptualized as a prepolitical association, but it is 
only by adopting concrete institutions that it can translate theoretical power 
into effective political sway. This is where the paradox of constitution com- 
plicates the paradox of conception. The practical imperative of institutionaliz- 
ing the nation to render its political claims effective means that those who 
succeed in speaking for the nation will in fact become the authors of the na- 
tional will. 
In addition, because the much vaunted unity of national identity and pur- 
pose is often expressed in-if not created by-state institutions like the Na- 
tional Assembly, the nation and the state become even more difficult to 
distinguish, further muddying the possibility of evaluating them separately. 
This tends to undermine the value of the nation as an independent legitimating 
basis for the state or a means of adjudicating between rival territorial and 
political claims. The paradox of constitution compounds this dilemma by en- 
hancing the presumptive legitimacy of nation-based demands without provid- 
ing a guide to evaluate their credibility apart from the convictions of those 
who make them. 
Composition: How to Define Insiders and Outsiders? 
The revolutionary revision of the French polity enshrined national (as opposed 
to royal) sovereignty as the source of and justification for political authority. 
Article III of the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
proclaimed: "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. 
No body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not emanate 
19 Jean-Pierre Gallais, Extrait d'un dictionnaire inutile, Compose par une Societe" en 
commandite, & ridige par un homme seul (A 500 lieues de 1'Assembl6e nationale, 
1790), p. 179, n. 1, author's trans. 
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expressly from the nation." 20 National self-determination replaced absolute 
monarchy as the standard for both domestic and international legitimacy.21 
The idea of national sovereignty provided the theoretical basis for the con- 
stitution of the nation-state. But what about its concrete composition? Simply 
positing the sovereignty of the nation was insufficient to ensure the viability of 
the state created in the nation's name. Criteria for national membership had to 
be identified and bonds of solidarity cultivated to foster political allegiance, 
compliance, and support for the revolutionary regime. Despite the importance 
of conceptual self-creation, national cohesion had to be based on more than just 
a contractual fiction to underpin the unity and effectiveness of the revolution- 
ary state. The question was (and remains) how to forge a voluntarist nation. The 
paradox of composition encapsulates this imperative and accounts for its poten- 
tially illiberal results. 
Although the monarchical nation had been held together by the king and 
delineated by his administration, the revolutionaries defined their version of the 
nation more subjectively and even metaphysically, based on the people's will to 
live together as a sovereign unit. The "will to live together" was assumed 
to exist among members of the French nation (those who spoke the French 
language or had a French "heart"), but not among undesirables: counter- 
revolutionaries, reactionary priests, or (during the years of the Terror) those 
who sought to challenge whoever happened to be in power or was considered 
politically or socially subversive. Solidarity was forged positively through sym- 
bols and festivals, but also negatively through exclusion and even executions. 
As the decade progressed, the perceived precariousness of successive rev- 
olutionary regimes fostered an exclusionary and even monolithic definition of 
national membership in response to the need to galvanize the nation as a bul- 
wark against competing sources of political authority and allegiance. This expe- 
rience suggests how the process of national consolidation, even if based on 
ostensibly voluntarist premises, may end up blurring the classic distinction 
between civic-inclusive and ethnic-exclusive nationalisms. 
The idea of the nation as a moral and political entity itself creates the need 
to delineate members from nonmembers. In theory, principles of delineation 
may be somewhat fluid and include, for example, an exit option. In practice, 
such openness tends to work against the emotional resonance and political util- 
20Jacques Godechot, ed., Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789 (Paris: Flam- 
marion, 1995), p. 34, author's trans. 
21 For example, Honore-Gabriel Comte de Mirabeau insisted in a speech to the 
National Assembly that "there exists but one sole principle of government for all 
nations, I mean by that their own sovereignty." Quoted in Gazette nationale ou le 
moniteur universel, Assemblee Constituante 4, No. 142, session of May 20, 1790, 
p. 418, author's trans. 
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ity of nationalist platforms. Nationalist leaders may feel that pure voluntarism 
is simply not enough to hold the nation together and to guarantee support for 
their control of the state. For a nation to establish a credible claim to its own 
exclusive territory and political institutions (or for credible claims to be made 
in its name), it must be robust and to some extent self-sustaining. This presents 
a central challenge to voluntarist nation-based conceptions of the state. 
Revolutionary leaders found themselves having to fortify their voluntarist 
conception of a French nation based on will with nonvoluntarist elements to 
preserve the resonance and viability of their nation-based claims. The most 
concrete manifestation of this modification on a territorial level was the idea of 
national self-determination as a one-way street. Once the revolutionary nation- 
state's parameters had been defined by those in power (ostensibly in accor- 
dance with the wishes of the people concerned), the inviolability of national 
unity precluded secession of a "part" from the "whole." This proposition became 
especially important in attempts to assert the right of all nations to determine 
their own political destiny (for example, for Avignon to "choose" to renounce 
its papal ties and incorporate itself into France), while precluding by definition 
the secession of any part of France. As General Jacques Franqois Menou, report- 
ing for the diplomatic committee on Avignon, explained: 
A people that is part of a society, that is bound by a contract, cannot make itself 
independent except by the consent of the other contracting parts; but [a peo- 
ple] that composes a complete society in itself, that never formed part of any 
other, that [people] is free, sovereign; it can adopt as it wishes any form of 
government; none has the right to prevent it from doing so; for the government 
is only made for the governed .... But, it will be said, it would result from 
these principles that each part of the French empire could declare itself inde- 
pendent. I answer that no part of the French empire is actually independent by 
that very fact that it is part of a society with which it has contracted .... No 
part of the empire has the right to break this contract.22 
By equating the French people with a nation that was by definition unified 
and internally cohesive, revolutionary leaders sought to preclude the possibility 
of internal threats to their own political supremacy, quickly developing mech- 
anisms to suppress and excise those that did emerge. The indivisibility of sov- 
ereignty reinforced the indivisibility of the nation, the entity said to possess it. 
And, in a twist characteristic of the Revolution, that indivisibility, that imper- 
ative of unity, and that automatic self-legitimation were claimed by the leaders 
of the (re)constituted state once it had been affirmed, or they had defined it, as 
national. The circle of self-validation closed once again. 
22 Gazette nationale ou le moniteur universel, Assemble Constituante 8, No. 121, 
session of April 30, 1791, pp. 264-265, author's trans. 
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Beyond the exclusionary criteria for membership based on political ideol- 
ogy, a cultural definition of the nation also emerged to bolster the nation's claim 
for entitlement to political self-expression in state institutions. These two sets 
of criteria-ideological and cultural-were related. For example, attempts to 
enforce linguistic uniformity became a central means of promoting and dissem- 
inating the new regime's policies, especially in rural areas that risked becoming 
counter-revolutionary enclaves under the influence of priests who refused to 
swear allegiance to the French constitution.23 Language became an essential 
tool for forging unity and concretizing identity. As the Revolution progressed, 
policies of linguistic homogenization reinforced the importance of cultural sim- 
ilarity alluded to by some prerevolutionary definitions of the nation but until 
then subordinated to territorial and administrative conceptions. 
The French language became both constitutive and emblematic of political 
and cultural solidarity. Its use became an essential marker of and medium for 
French national identity, blurring the distinction between voluntarist and non- 
voluntarist nations.24 The utility of a common language to the formation and 
articulation of a shared political will led to the promotion of linguistic unifor- 
mity. But the French language acquired much more than purely instrumental 
importance. It became emblematic and constitutive of national identity itself. 
The centrality of language to identity-formation ultimately trumped the accep- 
tance of cultural pluralism and the individual right to choose one's own linguis- 
tic and cultural ties. 
The ostensibly voluntarist French nation therefore sought more substantive 
and permanent foundations that began to point toward a more restrictive and 
even essentialist definition of membership. In an ideal civic nation, volunta- 
rism becomes a platform for a sense of identification and loyalty, with common 
participation, or at least representation, acting as a social and political cement. 
The question of whether or not pure voluntarism, with or without an "exit 
option," is strong enough to define and sustain an autonomous political unit 
remains contentious. The revolutionaries clearly felt that more was needed, as 
evidenced by their promotion of strict language policies and quasi-religious 
rituals that invoked common historic ties and a shared destiny among the French 
23The "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" in 1790 suppressed religious orders and 
required all priests to swear an oath of allegiance to the nation, the king, and the 
constitution. The refusal of many to do this created a profound division within the 
clergy and more generally within France. 
24See Abbe de Gr6goire, "Rapport sur la n6cessite et les moyens d'andantir les 
patois et d'universaliser l'usage de la langue franqaise," 16 prairial, year II; reprinted 
in H. de Certeau, D. Julia, and J. Revel, eds., Une politique de la langue. La Rdpub- 
liquefrangaise et les patois: L'enquete de l'Abbd Grdgoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 
pp. 300-317; and Bertrand de Barere, "Rapport du comit6 de salut publique sur les 
idiomes," 8 pluvi6se, year II; reprinted in ibid., pp. 291-299. 
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people.25 This perceived need for strong bonds among a nation's members, 
captured in the paradox of composition, continues to plague attempts to develop 
viable models of inclusive civic nationhood today. 
Confrontation: How to Interact with Other Political Units? 
The paradox of confrontation evokes the challenges faced by French revolu- 
tionaries in their attempt to implement a universalist nationalism during the 
revolutionary wars of the 1790s-that is, to spread the revolutionary ideals of 
national sovereignty and national self-determination in Europe. They did this 
through a policy of territorial annexation and the creation of virtual satellite 
states with French administrations in areas of Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, 
Germany, and even Italy.26 
The revolutionary conception of international society embodied the classic 
and enduring tension between cosmopolitan and nationalist visions and between 
the idea of a single human family and the notion of the nation as a self-enclosed 
moral and political unit. The revolutionary attempt to spread France's own 
model of national self-determination as a universal ideal was particularly antag- 
onistic and destabilizing in eighteenth-century Europe, which was composed of 
monarchical states. 
The revolutionary reconception and reconstruction of the French nation- 
state had direct implications for foreign policy and international relations in at 
least three ways. First, the revolutionaries saw their principles as relevant not 
only to the French nation, but also to humanity as a whole, compounding the 
implicit challenge the French example posed to the legitimacy of all European 
monarchies. Second, on a more active level, the French deemed themselves 
empowered to act on behalf of European peoples whose freedom was compro- 
mised by constitutional arrangements that failed to recognize their sovereignty 
and rights. Third, the revolutionary conception of international society that 
flowed from its domestic constitutive principles required the creation of a world 
of sovereign peoples unencumbered by the despotism of existing states-a world 
the revolutionaries charged themselves with creating, when not by invitation, 
then by military force. 
The principle of national sovereignty at the heart of the revolutionary vision 
was fundamentally at odds with the level of interference required by France's 
self-appointed liberationist mission, revealing the connection (and the potential 
conflict) between principles of constitution and patterns of confrontation. Inspired 
25 See, e.g., Confideration nationale, ou re'cit exact et circonstancie de tout ce qui 
s'est pass" a Paris, le 14 juillet 1790, a la Fid"ration (Paris: Garnery, 1790). 
26 See Jacques Dehaussy, "La Revolution franqaise et le droit des gens," in Re'volu- 
tion et droit international (Paris: A. Pedone, 1989), p. 96. 
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by a conviction in the moral unity of humankind, the revolutionaries clung to 
their emancipatory project, while handling its contradictory implications in inge- 
nious but often pernicious ways. 
As suggested previously, the cornerstone of revolutionary political theory 
was the idea of the nation as the source and first holder of sovereignty, sepa- 
rate from and prior to both the king and the state. Within France, the National 
Assembly drew its legitimacy from its claim to represent the French nation. 
The problem came when it and its successors pursued the self-appointed task 
of speaking on behalf of other nations, while acting to uphold their defini- 
tion of their interests, based on their own "universal" standards of legitimacy 
and justice. The revolutionary idea of self-determination for other nations 
demanded political organization in accordance with a French administrative 
model, as well as with ideological and material support for the French war- 
time cause. 
Revolutionary thinkers reconciled national sovereignty with the vision of a 
common humanity by offering a French definition of what that humanity entailed. 
The revolutionaries took their own struggle to be exemplary for the world as a 
whole. As such, being faithful to their ethical and political principles meant 
embracing a liberationist mission that reconciled the apparently divergent ideals 
of cosmopolitanism and French nationalism by defining the first as the culmi- 
nation of the second. This formed the ideological basis for the exportation of 
French principles and institutions during the 1790s as the essence of "Revolu- 
tionary Messianism." The revolutionaries were nationalists in championing 
France and universalists in upholding the French nation as the embodiment of 
ideals for all of humanity. The revolutionary ethos was so powerful precisely 
because of its ability to mobilize national sentiment around the promotion of 
allegedly universal values. 
As some contemporaries foresaw, the seeds of imperialism were contained 
in even the most ostensibly liberationist rhetoric. The revolutionaries' ideal of 
unity based on reason entailed a certain assumption of doctrinal and institu- 
tional uniformity, characteristic of "revolutionism" as a strand of international 
theory described by Martin Wight.27 The perceived need for collective mobi- 
lization while facing internal and external threats transformed the assumption 
of uniformity into an imperative. Revolutionary ideology had an (inter)nation- 
alist ontology (international society composed of distinct nations), a cosmopol- 
itan morality (with those nations joined by bonds of "fraternity," based on ideals 
of liberty and equality), and universalist ambitions (concerned with spreading 
and implementing the revolutionary interpretation of liberty, equality, and fra- 
ternity domestically and internationally). The revolutionary case is instructive 
27Martin Wight, in Gabrielle Wight and Brian Porter, eds., International Theory: 
The Three Traditions (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 8-12. 
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as a universalist nationalism based on cosmopolitan ideals, with echoes in lib- 
eral universalism today.28 
Although expansionist enterprises on the part of revolutionary France led to 
rampant disillusionment with French ideals among occupied populations, this 
did not entail rejection of national self-determination as a whole, but only of the 
French version of it. In fact, the French occupation and creation of virtual 
satellite states prompted local populations to draw on, consolidate, and even 
romanticize their own indigenous identities and traditions as a bulwark against 
French influence. This is the paradox or contradiction that arises in the attempt 
to implement a universalist doctrine of national self-determination. As long as 
the French insisted that neighboring nations "determine themselves" exclu- 
sively in France's own image, their posture as self-styled liberators was bound 
to undermine itself and appear naively hypocritical, if not intentionally duplic- 
itous. The French revolutionary rhetoric of liberation and national self- 
determination did indeed imprint itself on political discourse and on the popular 
imagination. Yet these ideas were more likely to be used against France than for 
it, in an act of ideological appropriation that foreshadowed the dynamic of 
twentieth-century anticolonial movements. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The study of the French Revolution summarized above was prompted by a 
desire to establish a historically grounded foothold in the morass of assump- 
tions and expectations that are embedded in the nation-state principle. The 
paradoxes of conception, constitution, composition, and confrontation are derived 
from this historical analysis but are also designed to serve as a framework for 
analyzing and evaluating other nation-based claims. Each paradox highlights a 
valuable use of the idea of the nation as a platform for political liberation in an 
international society composed of distinct, self-governing political and territo- 
rial units. But each benefit entails a corresponding warning that should form 
part of any inquiry into the legitimacy of claims on the part of actual or would-be 
nation-states. 
The paradox of conception highlights the importance of being able to appeal 
to the governed as the source of political authority, especially as a basis for 
challenging authoritarian rule. Strong versions of this argument go beyond merely 
demanding popular participation in government and actually posit the theoret- 
ical and factual existence of a prepolitical nation whose consent is required to 
28For an expanded account of this phenomenon, see Chimene Keitner, "War and 
Nationalism in the French Revolution: The Theoretical and Practical Challenges of 
Universalist Nationalism," ASEN Bulletin, No. 17 (1999), pp. 12-19. 
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legitimate the structure and exercise of governmental power. This idea becomes 
pivotal in claims that challenge the validity of political and territorial borders 
since the boundaries of "the nation" will not necessarily coincide with those of 
a particular state. When these boundaries conflict, appeals are often made to 
history (for example, long-standing title to territory and historical continuity as 
a distinct and previously self-governing group) in constructing a story about 
corrective justice to validate nation-based claims. These kinds of arguments 
rely on the premise that nations are ethically, conceptually, and even histori- 
cally distinct from and prior to states. The presumed connection between national 
self-determination and ideals of independence and democratic self-governance 
facilitate and enhance the effectiveness of this rhetorical move. 
Yet there is a danger that this idea of prepolitical nationhood will become 
abstract, reified, and ultimately detached from the welfare and concerns of the 
people it purports to encompass. The potential is magnified by the tendency of 
various groups and institutional actors to use claims on behalf of "the nation" as 
weapons in political power struggles. This leads to the paradox of constitution, 
which suggests how the claim to represent the people can be used both to 
promote and to undermine democratic rule. 
Once again, the idea of the nation is a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it is important for people to see themselves reflected in and represented 
by their political institutions so that they can accept the results of the political 
process as fair, legitimate, and binding. On the other hand, simply uphold- 
ing the idea of rule by the people begs the question of which population is 
the appropriate referent for establishing the territorial and demographic param- 
eters of legitimate governance and how best to institutionalize popular self- 
determination so imagined. 
The principle of one person, one vote is valid only if constituents perceive 
themselves as sufficiently united so that they will accept the majority decision 
on any particular issue as legitimate and binding. The legitimacy of majoritar- 
ian rule depends on the ability of the minority to become the majority, or for a 
given individual to be part of either the minority or the majority, depending on 
the issue at hand. This possibility presumes some uniformity in basic political 
and social values so that no particular subset of the population is categorically 
relegated to minority status and all members of the polity are able to participate 
in and influence the outcome of political decisions. 
The political challenge of nationhood in multinational states stems from the 
conviction that the members of a nation have so much in common that they will 
inevitably identify themselves as a permanent subset of the larger state popu- 
lation, negating the preconditions of democratic legitimacy outlined above. The 
nation-state principle in its pure form precludes the need to address the prob- 
lems of "deeply divided" societies precisely because national and state bound- 
aries are presumed congruent by definition. The simultaneous discrediting of 
assimilationism and the reluctance to endorse secession among "liberal" 
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approaches to this issue create an urgent need to find acceptable and effective 
ways of fostering cohesion, compliance, and commitment in multinational states. 
These problems are insufficiently recognized and cannot be addressed ade- 
quately within the enduringly (if often implicitly) nation-statist terms of many 
academic and political debates.29 
Such concerns lead directly to the paradox of composition as another site of 
political contestation in the French Revolution and today. The United States 
prides itself on being an open and inclusive model of citizenship based on 
common allegiance to a set of political principles (albeit an increasingly con- 
tested one). Yet its abysmally low voter turnout rates, intergroup violence, 
literal walling-off of private communities, and formation of militaristic anti- 
government organizations testify to a worrisome lack of social cohesion and 
commitment to a common political project. 
The exclusionary potential of ethnic nationhood seems clear and acknowl- 
edges its susceptibility to abuse as a basis for state authority and legitimacy. 
But even (and perhaps especially) in nonethnically based states, there remains 
an important need to harness or create some kind of social glue among citizens 
and some normative basis for attachment to and respect for political institutions. 
Theoretically, the nation-state principle makes sense only if nations are 
assumed to be cohesive and somewhat unitary; otherwise, there is no apparent 
reason to look to nations as the normative bases for constructing territorially 
separate and politically independent states. Fundamental reconceptualizations 
of the nature of identity, territoriality, and governance may be needed, but none 
will succeed that do not account for the factors supporting the development of 
the nation-state principle and the reasons for its perversions and failures. 
Even with the entrenchment of certain norms of customary international aw 
and the emergence of concepts such as crimes against humanity and universal 
jurisdiction, there remain fundamental and apparently irreconcilable differences 
in values and perspectives among states. The process of developing an inter- 
national criminal court has both demonstrated the potential for cross-boundary 
consensus and cooperation and painfully revealed its outer limits. Cultural diversity 
does not just involve tolerating visibly different languages, customs, and holi- 
days; it requires recognizing and providing space for completely different and 
encompassing ways of life that, so far, continue to find their highest political ex- 
pression in the aspiration for or reality of a sovereign state. Even ostensibly uni- 
versal values come up against the challenge of nonnegotiable conflicts. It is 
futile to rely on the force of the better argument when the dialogue cannot pro- 
ceed beyond what the terms of discussion are or should be. 
29For a related critique of proposals for "civic nationalism" and "constitutional 
patriotism," see Chimene Keitner, "The 'False Promise' of Civic Nationalism," Mil- 
lennium: Journal of International Studies 28, No. 2 (1999), pp. 341-351. 
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The paradox of confrontation addresses this tension between universalism 
and particularism in the global arena, suggesting both the positive and the dan- 
gerous aspects of the (often self-appointed) quest to create a better world, gen- 
erally in the image of its proponents. This observation should not lead to a blind 
endorsement of any practice deemed to be culturally specific, but it should 
encourage humility in the promotion of one's own values and a willingness to 
entertain the possibility that other legitimate perspectives exist. The radical 
disjunction between liberationist ends and coercive means will not be lost on 
the objects of such efforts or on third-party observers. There are no easy answers, 
but there are certainly attitudes and actions that make one's arguments more or 
less attractive to those they are designed to reach. 
Although these propositions are derived from a specific study of the French 
Revolution, they also capture and clarify some basic intuitions about the issues 
at stake in adhering, wholly or partly, to the idea of an international society of 
nation-states. 
The nation-state principle, even if allegedly outmoded, continues to pro- 
vide tacit support for conflicting claims to political and territorial control in the 
international arena. It bolsters the normative foundations of the sovereignty of 
states and gives self-identified nations a powerful instrument for challenging 
the political and territorial status quo, based on the argument that state borders 
do not follow the contours of prepolitical nations. The attractiveness of the idea 
of state sovereignty is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, despite the 
proliferation of multinational and transnational organizations; in the short term, 
processes of "globalization" may spark a retreat into statist forms. 
The appeal to a civic, as opposed to ethnic, variety of nationalism does not 
seem the best way to address the risk that such a retreat will lead to internal 
assimilation and external belligerence. Any explicit or implied appeal to pre- 
political nationhood is likely to create analogous problems. Claims to national 
self-determination based on a theory of correcting historical injustice should be 
dealt with on these terms, rather than by invoking a fiction of prepolitical nation- 
hood. Although this may entail replacing one allegedly arbitrary status quo 
with a previous one, it at least avoids the problem of differential citizenship in 
new, nation-based states that distinguish authentic members of the nation from 
"stranded" outsiders (for example, citizenship dilemmas in the Baltics). 
How can cohesion in and commitment to existing and new polities be ensured 
without recourse to the idea of nationhood? The emphasis on democratic gov- 
ernance is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. Traditional liberal 
notions of majority rule are insufficient to address the relationship between 
identity-based minorities and majorities in multinational states. Also, Western 
ideas of democracy depend on economic foundations and societal understand- 
ings that are not present in many parts of the world. We should neither under- 
estimate nor overestimate how much people have in common in our quest to 
imagine and implement new forms of global political life. Underestimation 
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may breed complacency, while overestimation may foster heavy-handed poli- 
cies that create more resentment than positive change. As with most things in 
life, we as international theorists and practitioners would be well advised to 
embrace the twin virtues of flexibility and balance as we attempt to navigate 
this difficult terrain. 
CONCLUSIONS: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS 
AND ENTITLEMENTS 
Just as the political possibility of secession today depends on the acceptance of 
national self-determination as a legitimate political goal (one recognized infor- 
mally in shared sets of understandings, or formally in international law), the 
political paths available to the French revolutionaries were informed, if not 
determined, by certain conceptual limits. In the 1790s, the French Revolution 
met with fierce opposition by political elites in the rest of Europe, precisely 
because it was perceived as exporting a new standard of political legitimacy 
that was fundamentally at odds with prevailing monarchical and dynastic 
principles. In the last century, Woodrow Wilson realized the unintended conse- 
quences of his rhetorical support for national self-determination when repre- 
sentatives of nationalities he had never even heard of flocked to him as a 
champion for their separatist aspirations, demonstrating the power of ideas in 
grounding and fueling concrete political claims.30 
Given the pervasiveness of multinational states and transnational processes, 
the nation-state principle may strike some as having little contemporary rele- 
vance. In fact, the widespread incongruity between theory and practice makes 
the nation-state idea more, not less, compelling as a subject of analysis. The 
presumed connection between nations and states still underlies and fuels the 
rhetoric of national sovereignty and the propagation of nation-based claims. 
This dynamic is especially evident in the continued resonance of appeals to 
national self-determination, in which leaders of stateless nations use the assump- 
tion that nations and states should be congruent to justify demands for increased 
political autonomy and even independence for specific national groups. As long 
as the nation-state idea informs the perceptions, assumptions, expectations, 
and attitudes of actual and would-be international actors (whether or not it is 
widely corroborated by the political status quo), it will continue to shape the 
limits of our international political imagination by providing grounds for com- 
peting claims to power and compromising the attractiveness of alternative, non- 
state options. 
30Woodrow Wilson, speech to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on 
August 19, 1919; in H.W.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 
vol. 4 (London: Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), p. 429. 
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Politics is not just about the exercise of power, but also about its justifica- 
tion. Power can best be exercised and compliance ensured when those sub- 
jected to it believe in its legitimacy. The use of the nation as a political platform 
was and is more than just a rhetorical device. It is a way of mobilizing individ- 
uals by shaping their conceptions of their political entitlements and their cor- 
responding expectations about what constitutes a cognizable grievance and what 
avenues are available for seeking redress. This intuitive observation, borne out 
by a study of the French revolutionary experience, suggests at least two possi- 
bilities for mitigating the incompatibility of conflicting political and territorial 
claims: first, reduce the sense of entitlement to nation-statehood built into cur- 
rent understandings of the international system; and second, create viable alter- 
natives that maximize political autonomy while minimizing competition over 
limited resources, especially territory. 
The fundamental constitutive puzzle of international society remains the 
question of how groups of individuals should organize and govern themselves. 
Conceptual frameworks like the one developed here can help isolate the ten- 
sions and assumptions implicit in various nationalist arguments and contribute 
to a more incisive evaluation of their foundations and potential results. In addi- 
tion, the historical analysis presented above strongly suggests the need to elu- 
cidate further the relationship between the internal and external dimensions of 
statehood. While the barrier between "inside" and "outside" is often taken for 
granted by both international relations scholars and political theorists, its theo- 
retical and practical impermeability is hardly self-evident in a dynamic, diverse, 
and developing world. 
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